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Juncker’s	State	of	the	Union:	Where	now	for
multispeed	Europe?
In	his	annual	State	of	the	Union	speech,	delivered	on	13	September,	European	Commission
President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	voiced	criticism	of	the	principle	of	‘multispeed	Europe’,	under	which
some	countries	within	the	EU	engage	in	integration	at	a	faster	pace	than	others.	Pol	Morillas
argues	that	while	it	is	reasonable	for	the	Commission	to	try	and	avoid	any	kind	of	second	class
Europe	from	developing,	debates	on	the	need	for	a	more	flexible	Union	are	unlikely	to	be	resolved
any	time	soon.
The	2017	State	of	the	Union	speech,	Credit:	©	European	Union	2017	–	European	Parliament	(CC	BY-NC-ND	4.0)
Jean-Claude	Juncker	was	harshly	criticised	when	he	presented	his	White	Paper	on	the	future	of	Europe	earlier
this	year.	At	that	time,	he	intended	to	throw	the	ball	back	to	member	states	to	decide	on	the	path	of	integration,
after	several	backlashes	against	his	initiatives	to	move	integration	forward.	Sidelining	the	European	Commission
and	its	proposals	to	tackle	the	euro	and	refugee	crises,	member	states	have	reinforced	the	dynamics	of	an
intergovernmental	Union.	In	Juncker’s	mind,	it	was	about	time	that	member	states	worked	to	avoid	the	risk	of
disintegration	(scenario	2	of	the	White	Paper),	conscious	that	the	appetite	for	a	federal	Union	was	low	after	Brexit
(scenario	5).
The	criticism	came	from	those	who	argued	that,	if	Juncker’s	Commission	was	the	“most	political”,	presenting
disintegration	as	a	plausible	scenario	was	a	dangerous	move.	Instead,	Juncker	should	have	proposed	a	way
forward,	making	full	use	of	the	Commission’s	right	of	initiative	and	not	opened	a	debate	on	the	future	of	Europe,
as	think	tanks	tend	to	do.
Between	then	and	his	annual	‘State	of	the	Union’	speech,	which	he	delivered	on	13	September,	a	constellation	of
forces	has	gathered	behind	multispeed	Europe	(scenario	3).	Emmanuel	Macron’s	election	in	France	and	the	slow
but	steady	acceptance	of	the	formula	by	Angela	Merkel	has	increased	the	prospects	of	reform	in	this	direction.
Also,	in	Versailles,	Italy	and	Spain	rallied	behind	the	multiple	speeds	formula.	Even	the	Commission	considered
this	idea	not	so	long	ago.
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But	in	his	speech,	Juncker	argued	against	a	multispeed	Europe.	Instead,	he	advocated	for	all	countries	to	join	the
Eurozone	by	2019	and	to	open	Schengen	to	Bulgaria,	Romania	and	Croatia	as	soon	as	possible.	There	shall	be
no	such	thing	as	“first	class”	Europe	if	all	countries	share	the	same	currency	and	enjoy	freedom	of	movement.
Full	integration	is	the	final	destination	and	“ever	closer	union”	arises	from	its	ashes.	Moving	on	from	his	White
Paper,	Juncker	outlined	the	formula	of	a	desired	sixth	scenario:	a	human,	protective	and	democratic	Union,	with	a
reinforced	(and	completed)	Eurozone	–	as	summarised	by	Pierre	Moscovici,	the	European	Commissioner	for
Economic	and	Financial	Affairs,	Taxation	and	Customs.
The	paradox	for	multispeed	Europe	is	that	when	big	member	states	seem	to	rally	behind	one	of	the	options
foreseen	in	the	White	Paper,	a	more	flexible	Union,	this	is	no	longer	desirable	for	the	Commission.	The	different
views	between	big	member	states	and	EU	institutions	on	the	way	forward	are,	to	an	extent,	back	to	square	one.
And	Macron	will	further	reinforce	this	split	when	he	unveils	his	proposals	to	move	along	multispeed	Europe	soon
after	Germany’s	election.
To	be	fair,	there	are	several	hurdles	for	multispeed	Europe	to	clear.	Germany	and	France	have	different
understandings	of	what	Eurozone	reform	really	entails.	Macron	favours	a	larger	EU	budget	for	joint	investment
and	solidarity,	a	Eurozone	finance	minister	and	a	parliament	for	the	euro.	But	Germany	would	prefer	to	scale
down	these	reforms	until	further	convergence	between	Eurozone	economies	is	achieved.	Germany	Finance
Minister	Wolfgang	Schäuble	also	believes	that	debtor	economies	must	undertake	sufficient	reforms	before	setting
in	motion	any	risk	sharing	mechanism.
Juncker	has	shown	sympathy	to	those	who	most	fear	multispeed	Europe.	The	rift	between	the	“ins”	and	the	“outs”
risks	splitting	the	EU27	if	the	latter	perceive	that	reforms	will	affect	their	capacity	to	have	a	say	in	the	process.
Juncker’s	backtracking	is	something	that	opponents	of	multispeed	Europe,	such	as	Poland,	which	is	also	caught
in	a	fight	with	the	Commission	over	the	use	of	Article	7,	will	welcome.	But	despite	current	alignments	with	Juncker
on	multispeeds,	it	is	unlikely	that	Poland	and	Hungary	will	stand	by	the	Commission	if	the	feuille	de	route
resembles	any	sort	of	European	federalism.
Finally,	multispeed	Europe	is	a	method,	not	a	political	goal.	Goal-wise,	it	is	reasonable	that	the	European
Commission	aims	to	strengthen	European	integration	and	avoid	any	kind	of	“second	class”	Europe.	But	as	a
method,	a	multispeed	or	flexible	Union	still	has	a	comparative	advantage	vis-à-vis	the	alternatives.	In	a	Union
incapable	of	delivering	long-lasting	solutions	to	its	crises	and	where	member	states	have	often	preferred	zero-
sum	outcomes	in	their	negotiations,	institutional	paralysis	will	always	be	a	plausible	outcome	when	the	next	crisis
hits.	Regardless	of	the	UK	leaving	the	EU,	it	will	still	be	difficult	to	agree	on	major	steps	forward	in	the	EU27	if
other	member	states	continue	to	disagree	on	crucial	EU	policies	and	if	the	Commission	is	sidelined	from	crisis
management.
Then,	when	divisions	reemerge,	the	debates	on	the	need	for	a	flexible	Union	will	also	resurface:	the	boomerang
of	European	politics	that	keeps	coming	back.	This	will	make	it	all	the	more	likely	that	the	first	scenario	of
Juncker’s	White	Paper,	muddling	through,	will	eventually	materialise.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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